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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue*

*

This issue was raised by one of the AFRC defense counsel in his opening statement: “Common Article 3
applies only if the hostile action directed against a legal government is of a collective nature and consists of
a minimum of organization.” Please comment on the accuracy and scope of the argument.
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Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions1 is one of the few provisions
ensuring the protection of civilians during times of internal armed conflict. While treaty
law rarely is concerned with civil wars and other intra-state conflicts, the drafters of the
Geneva Convention considered it necessary to establish the minimum threshold of
belligerency for the sake of defining human rights violations in internal armed conflicts.2
Article 3 has been the subject of controversy due to its arguably vague language. In fact,
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (hereinafter “AFRC”) has challenged the
applicability of Article 3, arguing that Article 3 is relevant only when the conflict is
directed against a legal government, is of a collective nature, and consists of a minimum
amount of organization. This memorandum reflects on the history of Article 3 and
attempts to reconcile scholarly and jurisprudential interpretations of Article 3 with the
facts informing the AFRC’s case to address whether Article 3 is an appropriate element
of the AFRC’s prosecution.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions is deliberately
undefined, to protect the greatest number of victims of internal
armed conflicts.
1

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
(Geneva Convention No. I), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention No. II), Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the protection of Civilian persons in Time of
War (Geneva Convention No. III), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention No. IV), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 238. [Reproduced
in accompanying notebooks at Tabs 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.]
See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (“Protocol I”), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force
Dec. 1978; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (“Protocol II”), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, entered
into force Dec. 7 1978. [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tabs 5 and 6, respectively.]
2

Commentary to Article 3 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Tim
of War, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE RED CROSS, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf (follow
“Commentaries” hyperlink; then follow “Article 3” hyperlink). [reproduced at the accompanying
notebooks at Tab 7]
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The delegates to the Geneva Conventions painstakingly chose the wording of
Article 3. The Geneva Conventions went through several drafts and a great deal of
discussion.3 While some delegates proposed guidelines to define phrases like “internal
armed conflict,”4 none were ever adopted. This measure was taken intentionally to
protect as many people as possible,5 and Article 3, now incorporated into customary
international law,6 is widely believed to indicate the absolute minimum standard of
protected human rights violations.7
2. Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions is incorporated
appropriately in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
and its application to Defendant’s case is proper.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter the “ICTR”) was the
first of the international tribunals to codify Article 3 in the statute used by the court.8
Since the Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereinafter the “Special Court”) faces similar
issues as an international prosecution of conflicts that occurred within one state’s national

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-95-1-T Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction (1995) [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 8]
7

Tadic, supra note 6; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. ___ (2006) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebooks at Tab 9]; David A. Elder, The Historical Background of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention of 1949, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 37 (1979) [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at
Tab 10]; INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE RED CROSS, supra note 2. [reproduced in the
accompanying notebooks at Tab 7]
8

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, (1994) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebooks at Tab 11]
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boundaries, the Special Court followed suit with its statute.9 Included in Defendant’s
indictment is Article 3(d) of the Statute of the Special Court which criminalizes
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions.10 This charge is properly
applied to Defendant’s case, as the Court will likely find that the charges alleged against
the AFRC fit into even a narrow, conservative definition of Article 3, regardless of the
disorganized nature of the conflict.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Indictment of The Special Court for Sierra Leone
Three top-ranking members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council are the
named defendants for the prosecution against the AFRC. Major Johnny Paul Koroma of
the AFRC, who allegedly led the coup d’etat on the democratically elected government
of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on May 25, 1997, was reported dead before he could
be indicted.11 The United Nations and the Special Court consider Koroma’s whereabouts
to be unknown, and there are ongoing efforts to apprehend him.12
The three AFRC defendants, Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and
Santigie Borbor Kanu, are charged with 14 counts of crimes against humanity, violations
of Common Article 3, and other serious violations of international law in violation of

9

The Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. SCR 1315 (August 14, 2000). [reproduced in the
accompanying notebooks at Tab 12]
10

Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, (Indictment) Case
no. SCSL-2004-16-PT [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 13]; The Statute for the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, supra at note 9.

11

Background Note: Sierra Leone, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 14]
12

Completion Strategy, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (2005), available at http://www.scsl.org/Documents/completionstrategy.pdf. [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 15]
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Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Special Court Statute.13 Previously, all three of the named
defendants were officers in the Sierra Leone Army (hereinafter the “SLA”), which
provided many of the members of the AFRC.14 As leaders in the AFRC, the defendants
allegedly presided over the country after seizing power in the May 1997 coup and led
attacks against civilians, including attacks in the Koinadugu and Bombali Districts in
1998 and the attack on Freetown of January 6, 1999.15 The indictment alleges that the
defendants acted in concert with Charles Taylor, Johnny Paul Koroma, and the named
defendants in the case against the Revolutionary United Front (hereinafter the “RUF”) to
take control of Sierra Leone, and particularly the diamond mining areas of Sierra Leone.
B. A Brief History of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
A vicious civil war loomed over Sierra Leone for most of the 1990s. Child
soldiers, mutilated limbs and slogans carved into the chests of victims became the
emblems of the hostilities. Two-thirds of the population was displaced, and six hundred
thousand citizens fled to other countries.16
The AFRC came into being in early 1997, when the SLA, the government army,
staged a mutiny against the new democratic government, opening the maximum-security
jail and releasing army detainees, including Johnny Paul Koroma. In response, President
Tejan Kabbah fled the country and halted army food supplies. The SLA and Koroma
13

Special Court Statute, supra at note 9 [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 12],
Indictment, supra at note 10. [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 13]
14

Indictment, supra at note 10, Sierra Leone, A Distastrous Set-Back for Human Rights, Amnesty
International (1997), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/ (follow “1997” hyperlink; then follow
“Sierra Leone” hyperlink). [reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 16]

15

Id.

16

John Cerone, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Establishing a New Approach to International
Criminal Justice” 8 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 379, 380 (2001-2002) [reproduced in accompanying
notebooks at Tab 17]
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invited RUF forces to come out of hiding to form a new government junta called the
AFRC.17 The 1997 attack against Freetown was characterized by violent human rights
abuses, including arbitrary killings, mutilations, rape, abduction and torture. Amnesty
International reported in 1997 that it was difficult to ascertain who was more responsible,
the government army or the RUF,18 probably since the RUF and the SLA had more or
less joined forces, now calling themselves the AFRC. For ten months, the AFRC
controlled Freetown, until an intervention force of primarily Nigerian troops drove them
out in February 1998. With financial and weapons resources replenished from the many
months of access to the national armories, the AFRC retreated into smaller communities
outside of the grasp of the intervention forces. President Kabbah returned and the
international community considered Sierra Leone to be somewhat stable. 19
It was not. During 1998, the AFRC/RUF was responsible for “Operation No
Living Thing”20 in which several thousand Sierra Leoneans were killed or attacked.
Amnesty International’s eyewitnesses reported hundreds of bodies lying dead or gravely
wounded in the brush after the AFRC/RUF swept through villages. Between April and
early May 1998, the Freetown hospital was flooded with patients seeking medical help
for mutilation: on one day alone, four people came in with both arms severed off, and 23
came in with only one arm. Hands, fingers and ears were also reportedly cut off by
17

Richards [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 18, McGregor [reproduced in the
accompanying notebooks at Tab 19], THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra at note 11
[reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 14], Babafemi Akinrinade, “International Humanitarian
Law and the Conflict in Sierra Leone” 15 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 391, 400 (2001)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 20]
18

Sierra Leone Yearly Report 1997, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (1997), available at:
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar97/ [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 21]

19

McGregor supra at note 17 at 486-487; Richards, supra at note 17, at 45

20

Footnote. Cite this.
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machetes. All of the victims were civilians – farmers, housewives, merchants and
students. Between April and July of 1998, the hospital had treated nearly 300 victims for
mutilations, gunshot wounds and amputations. One fifth of those treated were children.
Moreover, the people who were treated at the hospital in Freetown represent only a
fraction of the people who were dismembered, tortured, mutilated and otherwise
wounded who could not make it to the hospital. Refugees fled the northern and eastern
districts in Sierra Leone; Guinea reported taking in over 100 refugees, half of them
deliberately mutilated. Whole villages in the northern and eastern districts were attacked,
citizens tortured, killed and brutalized, and the structures burned to the ground. Mothers
watched their infants thrown into rivers and children witnessed the torture and mutilation
of their parents. Everyone who could not run away from the AFRC/RUF was attacked,
raped or murdered.21
The AFRC/RUF launched another attack against Freetown in January 1999, this
time managing to drive out the Nigerian intervention forces, and, in so doing, committing
atrocities against civilians great enough to bring Sierra Leone back into the eye of the
international community.22 The property damage alone left as many as 20,000 people
homeless.23 Unarmed civilians were “arbitrarily killed, mutilated, raped and abducted”
according to Amnesty International reports. Medical reports put the number of killing at
6,000, and while most killings were arbitrary, journalists, government officials, lawyers,

21

Sierra Leone 1998 – A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL YEARLY
REPORTS, (1998) available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ (follow the “Sierra Leone” hyperlink,
then follow the “1998” hyperlink). [reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 22]
22

Akinrinade, supra at note 17, at 401

23

Sierra Leone Yearly Report 1999, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (1999), available at:
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/sierra_leone/ (follow “1999” hyperlink). [reproduced in the
accompanying notebooks at Tab 23]
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human rights workers, prison officials and police officers were targeted. Freetown
hospitals reported that over 500 people required surgery for mutilation, including severed
limbs. Women and girls were rounded up and raped in public, and it is estimated that
90% of women who were abducted were raped. Men, women and children were
abducted from Freetown. The men and boys were “recruited” into the AFRC/RUF
armies, the women and girls were held as sexual slaves and forced to take on domestic
tasks. There were as many as 4,000 children reported missing from Freetown after the
January attack, most presumed abducted.24 After terrorizing the city, the AFRC/RUF
withdrew back into the rural areas of Sierra Leone, and continued committing atrocities
along the way. Towns east of Freetown reported similar abuses.25
In July 1999, the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone signed the Lome
Peace agreement, which excluded the AFRC almost entirely, but for token references.26
The Lome Peace Agreement made the RUF a political party and gave government roles
overseeing peace and reconstruction to Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, and to
Johnny Paul Komora.27 Implementation of the treaty was sluggish, and doubts that the
RUF was not committed to the peace process were confirmed when, in less than a year,
the AFRC/RUF took up arms once more, this time against the United Nations’
peacekeeping force, UNAMSIL. Trying to embarrass the United Nations and provoke

24

Id.

25

Richards, supra at note 17; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra at note 22

26

Lome Peace Accord, Sierra Leone-R.U.F., May 25, 1999, available at: http://www.sierraleone.org/lomeaccord.html, Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone, S/2000/189, March 7, 2000 [reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tabs 24 and 14,
respectively]

27

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra at note 22
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the UNAMSIL soldiers, the RUF and the AFRC terrorized the country for most of 2000.
Finally, in November 2000, Sierra Leone and the RUF signed the Abuja Ceasefire
Agreement.28 Since then, Sierra Leone and the United Nations have made progress
toward peace in Sierra Leone and justice for the victims of the years of bloodshed.29
C. The Named Defendants
Alex Tamba Brima and Brima Bazzy Kamara were both staff sergeants in the
SLA. Santigie Borbor Kanu was a sergeant in the SLA. Allegedly, all three men were
among the 17 soldiers who staged the coup d’etat, ousting President Kabbah from power
in 1997, and subsequently, Alex Tamba Brima and Brima Bazzy Kamara were appointed
by Johnny Paul Koroma to the positions of Public Liaison Officers of the new AFRC
government, and all three men were given memberships on the AFRC Supreme Council.
In 1998, when the AFRC retreated from its seat of power in Freetown, it is alleged that
Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu led the AFRC/RUF
forces in the northern Kono district, and they are suspected of leading ARFC/RUF
operations in various other districts in northern and eastern Sierra Leone. The purpose of
these operations, referred to as “Operation No Living Thing” and described in some
detail above, was to terrorize the citizenry of Sierra Leone and to punish their supposed
support of President Kabbah. In the January 1999 attack against Freetown, allegedly
Alex Tamba Brima was commander-in-chief leading the attack on the ground, and Brima

28

Abuja Ceasefire Agreement, Sierra Leone-R.U.F., July 7, 1999, available at: http://www.scsl.org/abujaagreement.html [reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 25]. See also Eighth report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/1199, Dec. 15. 2000
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab ___]

29

Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/1055,
Nov. 7, 2000 (reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab __]
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Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu were likewise commanders during the attack.
It is thought that all three men consistently held leadership positions within the AFRC.30
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions: History, Development and
Application
1. The Red Cross and Common Article 3
At the urging of the International Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter the
“ICRC”), the first Geneva Conventions were signed in 1864 by a handful of European
states. The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in
the Armies in the Field marked the birth of modern international humanitarian law.31 In
1906, the first Geneva Convention was revisited and more specific terms were added.32
The 1906 version remained in force until 1929, when in the wake of the First World War,
the delegates added the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War. In 1949, after World War II, State parties again met, this time to update The
30

Alex Tamba Brima, TRIAL WATCH (2006), available at: http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trialwatch/profile/db/facts/alex-tamba_brima_214.html [reproduced in accompnaying notebooks at Tab 26];
Brima Bazzy Kamara, TRIAL WATCH (2006), available at: http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trialwatch/profile/db/facts/brima-bazzy_kamara_213.html [reproduced in accompany notebooks at Tab 27];
Santigie Borbor Kanu, TRIAL WATCH (2006), available at: http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trialwatch/profile/db/facts/santigie-borbor_kanu_209.html [reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 28].
TRIAL Watch “is an Association under Swiss law founded in June 2002. It is apolitical and nonconfessional. Its principal goals are in the fight against impunity for the perpetrators accomplices and
instigators of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of torture. TRIAL will go to court
and defend the interests of the victims of such acts before the Swiss courts and the International Criminal
Tribunal.”
31

Joyce A.C. Gutteridge, “The Geneva Conventions of 1949” 26 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 294 (1949)
[reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 29]; From the Battle of Solferino to the Eve of the First
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Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field (hereinafter the “First Geneva Convention”), the Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea (hereinafter the “Second Geneva Convention”) which originated in 1907,33
the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter the “Third
Geneva Convention”) and the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War (hereinafter the “Fourth Geneva Convention”) which in its previous
incarnation had been a series of resolutions.34 In the years following the Second World
War, these four treaties were signed by nearly every nation in the world.35
Horrified at the atrocities committed during World War II and at the vulnerability
of civilians in wartime without laws of war to protect them, the ICRC solicited support
for the inclusion of Article 3.36 The ICRC was persuasive, since the drafters considered it
of utmost importance to distinguish between soldiers and those who were unarmed, to the
extent that the Common Article 3 set of protections created for civilians in wartime was
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Introduction to the Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
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repeated in each of the Conventions.37 Article 3, as included in the four Conventions, is
far more expansive than its predecessors, in large part because the drafters had witnessed
during World War II what can happen when there is no rule of law to protect civilians.
Common Article 3 stands apart from the other provisions of the Conventions in
that it does not address conflicts between States.38 While the Conventions primarily are
focused on protecting soldiers and noncombatants in traditional inter-state wartime,
Common Article 3 extends the reach of the Conventions to conflicts within states – an
unprecedented move in international treaty law making and a clear step toward insistence
that the individual’s human rights take precedence over State affiliation. It is
unsurprising that the ICRC would be concerned with the health and safety of the
individual. It is incredible that the ICRC successfully suggested to the States’ delegates
that protecting the human rights of the individual was of such great consequence that the
drafters were able to look beyond the traditional rules of treaty making – that treaties
should govern only inter-state actions – to include a provision that would protect all
people in all conflicts.39
2. Traveaux Preparatoires40
However, in order for the various state parties to agree to this revolutionary
concept, the ICRC and the drafters faced a challenge in trying to draft a statute that would
be sufficiently broad to meet the human rights needs of victims of war, and would be

37
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acceptable to the delegates. Few countries would accept a provision that made them
responsible for the people of another country. For example, when the ICRC first
suggested the concept for Common Article 3 at the 1912 ICRC Conference, it was not
even discussed.41 No one was interested in taking care of another state’s unfortunates.
By 1921, after watching the Spanish Civil War, a resolution was passed that applied the
laws of war to civil wars. The resolution detailed the specific role the IRCR had in
providing aid in these internal conflicts. The resolution was not the same as a
Convention, but it gave the ICRC the leverage to compel soldiers in civil wars to respect
the Geneva Conventions. A subsequent 1939 resolution strengthened the 1921 effort, and
an effort in 1946 to add the resolution to the Geneva Conventions was taken seriously,
though the language of the suggested provision was diluted significantly. Still, by 1949,
the delegates at the Geneva Conference were ready to accept this as part of the Geneva
Conventions.
The language of Article 3 was widely debated. The Article saw several drafts.
The drafters were principally concerned with getting too involved with intra-state politics
and extending the protective rules of international conflicts to civil wars, which are not
governed by the rules of international law. However, most supported the Article, citing
the cruelty of civil war, “the absurdity of branding all violent dissidence as common
criminality” when frequently civil wars were rebellions against governments, and the
actual behavior in a civil war that is not different from that of an inter-state war.42 A

41
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“Commentaries” hyperlink; then follow “Article 3” hyperlink). [reproduced at the accompanying
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committee was formed at the Diplomatic Conference that would take into account the
previous incarnations of the Article, as well as proposals from the participating States.43
The proposals all emphasized different criteria for applicability.
The French proposal, for example, wanted to limit the Article only to cases of an
organized military force. The Spanish proposal extended applicability to “insurgents
organized as militia,”44 while the United States advocated for applicability only when the
insurgents “purport[ed] to have the characteristics of a State,”45 and the Australian
proposal required recognition from the de jure government that the insurgents were
belligerents or from the United Nations that the insurgents were a threat to international
peace.46
The language of the final draft of Common Article 3 eventually was culled in
large part from the Italian proposal.47 The Italian proposal was preferred as it restated
clearly the principles of international humanitarian law, and as it did not require formal
42

Elder, 44 supra at 34 [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 35]. See also James E. Bond,
Internal Conflict and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 48 DENV. L.J. 263 (1971-1972) [reproduced in
the accompanying notebooks at Tab 36] See also Gutteridge, supra at note 29 [reproduced in the
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The Italian proposal reads as follows: “The High Contracting Parties, conscious of their
obligation to come to an agreement in order to protect civilian populations from the horrors of war,
undertake to respect the principles of human rights which ay constitute the safeguard of civilization and, in
particular, to apply, at any time and in all places, the rules given hereunder:
(1) Individuals shall be protected against any violation to their life and limb.
(2) The taking of hostages is prohibited.
(3) Executions may be carried out only if prior judgment has been passes by regularly constituted
court, furnished with the judicial safeguards that civilized peoples recognize to be indispensable.
(4) Torture of any kind is strictly prohibited.
These rules, which constitute the basis of universal humanitarian law, shall be respected without prejudice
to the special stipulations provided for in the present Convention in favour of protected persons.”
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status as criteria for applicability, meaning that the Article would apply as the minimum
standard for humanitarian protection in all conflicts.48 The committee approved of the
Italian proposal because it stood alone and apart from the rest of the Conventions, yet
synthesized the principles of the Conventions. There would be no confusion whether or
not Article 3 applied in international conflicts or non-international conflicts – it would
always apply.49
Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions was decided upon thus:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other
similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the
present Convention.
48
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The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status
of the Parties to the conflict.
At the Diplomatic Conference, the delegates decided to leave out a description of
an internal conflict to give Article 3 the greatest possible breadth.50 Not everyone was
entirely satisfied with this approach, and many countries offered explanations of what
they would consider a non-international conflict. Some States were concerned that
Article 3 would recognize isolated acts of banditry as the province of international law,
and that petty criminals would be held to the standards of the Geneva Conventions.51
Others wanted to be sure that the Article was broad enough to include rebels rising up
against their government. The Swiss representative argued that there was nothing on the
face of the Article implying that it would apply to individual crimes; that in the case of an
“armed conflict” there must in fact be an armed conflict, not one instance of violence.
The Swiss representative defined the ambiguity as: “an armed conflict, as understood in
this provision, implies some form of organization among the Parties to the conflict.”52
Notwithstanding the Swiss assessment, the language of the Article was unchanged, and
the phrase “armed conflict,” in particular, remains undefined in Common Article 3.
The ICRC Commentaries also note that Article 3 has a self-policing quality as
well. Who would risk the international shame of claiming that Article 3 does not apply,
in order to justify killing and torturing civilians?53 On the other hand, a regime interested
solely in quashing its opposition also is not necessarily looking for international allies.54
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B. Common Article 3, Customary International Law and Opinio Juris
Common Article 3 has been accepted as a part of customary international law. It
has been codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and in the
Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and, most importantly, in the
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.55 In fact, in the Security Council’s report
establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Security Council noted “violations of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions . . . have long been considered customary
international law.”56 Common Article 3 has been enforced as customary law in
judgments from the International Court of Justice,57 the ICTY and the ICTR,58 and in
domestic courts.59
Not only Common Article 3, but, indeed, the “Law of Geneva,” that is, the
principles of the four Geneva Conventions, is widely accepted as customary international

53

Id.

54

Alfred P. Rubin The Status of Rebels Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 21 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 472
at 429 (1972) [reproducedin the accompanying notebooks at Tab 37]

55

Special Court Statute, supra at note 9; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra
note 8; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 25 May 1993, U.N. Res.
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law.60 As a majority of States have ratified them,61 and since the Conventions are widely
followed, the Conventions have become customary law, binding even on those few States
that have not ratified the Conventions. Sierra Leone, moreover, is a party to the Geneva
Conventions, and ratified them in 1965.62
Most criminal statutes created for international courts have codified Common
Article 3, proving its prominence in customary international law. The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court uses language virtually identical to that of Common
Article 3 in Article 8, Section 2(c), and in fact directly refers to Common Article 3 as the
basis for the rule.63 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda also
explicitly cites Common Article 3 in Article 4 of its statute.64 Article 3 of the Statute of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone also invokes Common Article 3 and it even expands
on the violations that will apply to Common Article 3.65 The Statute of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, respecting the principle of nullem crimen sine lege,66 only includes as
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crimes clear violations of customary international law or principles taken from
international instruments to which Sierra Leone is a party.67
Moreover, when Common Article 3 has come up for judicial review, judges have
held that it is customary law. In the judgment of Nicaragua v. United States, one of the
first international cases to opine on Common Article 3, the International Court of Justice
declared Common Article 3 to be customary law, holding “these rules . . . constitute a
minimum yardstick” of humanity.68 The International Court of Justice went on to say in
the Nicaragua judgment that the rules of Common Article 3 were so basic that they
applied to all armed conflicts, regardless of international or non-international status.69
Although some scholars have criticized this decision as being based on aspirations and
not actual practice70 and as being too broad to provide any clarity,71 the Nicaragua
judgment has influenced opinio juris greatly since then. More recently, the Supreme
Court of the United States recognized Common Article 3 as customary international law
in their decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, holding that Common Article 3 ensures the
rights of those labeled as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay.72
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When challenged, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals have upheld
Common Article 3 as an accepted tenet of customary international law. The decisions of
the ad hoc tribunals are regarded as great authority and are the primary persuasive
precedent for other international tribunals, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone;73
however, those decisions are not necessarily binding on the Special Court. Initially, it
was unclear whether Common Article 3 violations were prohibited under customary
international law.74 Certainly, when the question came before the ICTY, which, unlike
the Rome Statute and the ICTR statute, did not include a provision criminalizing
violations of Common Article 3, the court had to consider whether internal armed
conflicts could be defined as war crimes at all. The court decided in Prosecutor v. Dusko
Tadic that not only do the Geneva Conventions represent customary international law,
but the Common Article 3 is to be applied to all armed conflicts, regardless of its
international or non-international character.75 Afraid that jurists were losing sight of
human beings in the debate over international conflict versus internal conflict, the Tadic
court decided that it was in keeping with the purpose of the Geneva conventions to
eliminate the distinction between internal and international conflicts, and on appeal, this
was upheld as an “authoritative interpretation” of Common Article 3.76 The court
addressed the issues again in the Celebici case, in which it used no uncertain terms to
atrocities committed in Bosnia under the Alien Tort Claims Act. See Kadic, supra at note 57 [reproduced
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73

Guenael Mattraux, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS (2005) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebooks at Tab 49]

74

Id.

75

Tadic, supra at note 6 [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 8]

76

Id. Michael P. Scharf, Balkan Justice (1997) [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 50)

26

uphold the customary nature of Common Article 3.77 The court in Celebici, so
convinced of the fundamental nature of the law of Common Article 3, not only affirmed
that it applied to international and internal armed conflicts, but that it represented the
absolute minimum standard “of protection to persons who are in the middle of an armed
conflict but are not taking any active part in the hostilities.”78
In Rwanda, where the statute for the ICTR explicitly criminalizes violations of
Common Article 3, the court in the Akayesu, Rutaganda, and the Kayishema and
Ruzindana decisions held that Common Article 3 is customary law.79 Indeed, the ICTR
Statute was designed with customary law in mind; to be as fair as possible, and for the
sake of the legitimacy of the tribunal, the ICTR statute includes only those offenses
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which are clear violations of international criminal law.80 The Special Court Statute
followed this model as well. The Akayesu decision further noted that the penal codes of
most States “have criminalized acts which if committed during internal armed conflict,
would constitute a violation of Common Article 3”81 demonstrating by the widespread
acceptance of the principles of Common Article 3 that it has become customary law.
C. Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3
The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were added in 1977,
nearly 30 years after the original. Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II are often
linked in international law scholarship as both treaties address non-international conflicts.
Despite this trend, the two treaties are separate, complementary bodies that are not meant
to influence or change the other.82 Additional Protocol II set out to clarify the concept of
non-international armed conflict without limiting the breadth and applicability of
Common Article 3.83 Additional Protocol II, as international criminal courts have
pointed out, has only “elaborated and extended the protections of the Geneva
Conventions.”84 The ICRC’s own commentaries assert that Additional Protocol II was
conceived as an independent instrument to avoid “undercutting the scope of Article 3
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itself” and that “Common Article 3 retains a separate existence.”85 When considering
Common Article 3, then, it is important to confuse neither the scope of applicability of
Common Article 3 nor the class of people protected by Common Article 3 with those
articulated in Additional Protocol II.
D. The AFRC and Common Article 3
1. The AFRC hostilities were an armed conflict
Of the scant requirements for Common Article 3 applicability, the first is that the
event in question was in fact an armed conflict. Though this paper has addressed the
difficulty in defining “armed conflict,” it has not yet settled on a formula. Article 3 itself
uses the language “armed conflict” but without explaining what level of organization,
continuity, force or success is necessary to qualify as an armed conflict.86 Since internal
conflicts can “range from riots or insurrections through guerilla movements to civil wars
or even mushroom into international conflicts”87 legal scholars have tried to define
“armed conflict” by limiting the cases in which it is applicable. To attempt to limit the
meaning of “armed conflict” is outside of the purpose of the Article, however, and the
following section will address various recent interpretations of “armed conflict,” as well
as discussing why interpreting the phrase is inconsistent with the goals of the Geneva
Conventions.
In order to determine if the AFRC campaigns constituted an armed conflict, we
have to look at the legal standard set by jurists, scholars and governments, as well as the
85
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notebooks at Tab 33]
86

Alfred P. Rubin, The Status of Rebels Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 21 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
472 AT 484 (1972) [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 57]
87

Bond, supra at note 40 [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 36]

29

legislative history and purpose of the Article, while keeping in mind that the Special
Court for Sierra Leone is not legally bound by any of those standards. The legislative
history of Article 3 is discussed extensively above,88 although it is worth reiterating that
Common Article 3 went through numerous drafts, and many of those drafts were
specifically concerned with defining “armed conflict.” The challenge was to find a
definition that each country found non-threatening, and in the end, the delegates gave up
trying to define “armed conflict.” Instead, they decided to list which most egregious
human rights could not be violated under any circumstance of internal violence. The
committee reports reveal that the delegates generally thought Common Article 3 applied
to belligerencies, civil wars and insurgencies, but not to bandits or riots.89
The purpose of Common Article 3 is to limit the amount of suffering in wartime,
particularly for those uninvolved with the conflict.90 Any question about applying
Common Article 3 must be mindful of this purpose. While military necessity will
sometimes allow for terror tactics, military necessity cannot authorize human rights
violations,91 and it is those most essential human rights that Common Article 3 seeks to
ensure.
Recent jurisprudence has all but defined “armed conflict” as an armed
confrontation between two or more States, between a State and another body, between a
State and a rebel faction, or between two such factions within a State.92 In the Tadic case
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of the ICTY, the Appellate Chamber defined armed conflict as “protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State.”93 The ICTR has relied on this definition in subsequent cases such
as Musema, in which the Trial Chamber defined internal armed conflict as “the existence
of open hostilities between armed forces which are organized to a greater or lesser
degree. Within these limits, non-international armed conflicts are situations in which
hostilities break out between armed forces or organized armed groups within the territory
of a single state.”94 In Rutaganda, the ICTR further defined armed conflict as a conflict
similar to that of internal conflicts, but taking place within a single state.95 In Akayesu,
an “evaluation test” of the level and extent of violence and atrocities was necessary to
apply Common Article 3.96 No decision has exactly pinpointed when a violent campaign
turns into an armed conflict, but many suggest that the more brutal the conflict, the more
likely it is that Common Article 3 will apply.
Other judicial interpretations of Common Article 3 uphold the standard that it
applies in cases of extreme brutality and human rights violations, regardless of the
official status of the participants. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that
an attack that lasted only 30 hours, between national armed forces and a group of 42
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armed civilians constituted a Common Article 3 violation.97 The Inter-American Court
held that Common Article 3 exists for the protection of civilians, and will be invoked in
the event an armed conflict infringes on the basic human rights of civilians.98
Nowhere in the language of Common Article 3 is the term “armed conflict”
strictly defined, and, according to the legislative history, this was done purposefully. For
the sake of continued adherence and effectiveness, the Article must encompass an array
of conflicts.99 The subsequent commentaries on the Geneva Conventions agree that
Common Article 3 was deliberately left undefined, ensuring that the Article would appeal
to as many governments as possible and would apply to as many armed conflicts as
necessary to ensure that the human rights of civilians and other hors de combat are not
violated.100 Although definitions like those proffered by the other ad hoc tribunals are
useful, persuasive authority, they are not controlling. Ultimately, the Special Court must
decide whether the AFRC’s brutalities are the kind of human rights violations Common
Article 3 was meant to protect.
The ICRC has set forth in its Commentaries four factors for determining whether
Article 3 is applicable in an internal armed conflict. First, the ICRC proposed that if the
insurgency would be classified as a belligerent – that the party in revolt against the de
jure government had an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts,
acting within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting the Convention –
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Article 3 should apply. Second, if the de jure government has organized its military
against that of the insurgents, Article 3 should apply. Third, if the conflict has been
brought to the attention of the United Nations, Article 3 should apply. Fourth, if the
insurgents have an organization claiming the characteristics of a state and are exercising
authority over the territories under its control, Article 3 should apply. The Commentaries
make it clear that these factors are neither exhaustive nor obligatory. If none apply,
Article 3 can still apply, the scope of Article 3 being “as wide as possible.”101
In the case of the AFRC, the hostilities most assuredly can be characterized as an
armed conflict, as opposed to an internal disturbance, a riot or a demonstration, as the
AFRC was organized under military command and was able to continue military
operations over the course of a few years.102 The United Nations reported that the
conditions in Sierra Leone “resemble[d] civil war.”103 The AFRC was a rebel faction
fighting against the State and the supporters of the State. The AFRC was organized
under the rule of Johnny Paul Komora and other AFRC and RUF leaders. The AFRC was
well-armed and it had the manpower and the resources to wage a brutally violent
campaign against the government and citizenry of Sierra Leone for years.104 That the
AFRC was in fact organized and that they were armed indicates that applying Common
Article 3 is proper.

101

Elder, 52 supra at note 34, quoting II B Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva of 1949 at
101-102 (1951). [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at 35]

102

Akinrindae [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 58]

103

Fifth Report to the Secretary-General on the United Nation Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/751, July
31, 2000 [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 14]
104

Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/832, Aug.
24, 2000 [reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab __]

33

2. The AFRC hostilities were of a non-international character
The second requirement for Common Article 3 applicability is that the conflict be
of a non-international character. For the most part, the war in Sierra Leone took place
among Sierra Leonean citizens, within the territory of Sierra Leone. Toward the end of
the conflict, the AFRC fought against the Nigerian army who had taken over Freetown
and against UNAMSIL. However, in the absence of any state formally at war with Sierra
Leone, the conflict must be described as non-international.105
3. The AFRC hostilities took place in the territory of a State party
The final element that the ARFC hostilities must meet for Common Article 3 to
apply is that the hostilities took place within a State that had ratified the Geneva
Conventions. Sierra Leone ratified the Geneva Conventions in 1965.106 The AFRC’s
attacks were contained within the territory of Sierra Leone. The AFRC conflict clearly
meets the final element.
4. Specific Violations of Common Article 3 in the AFRC conflict
The entirety of the civil war in Sierra Leone was characterized by human rights
violations of the most egregious sort. Every party to the conflict, not just the AFRC, has
been accused of violating the laws of war.107 The AFRC/RUF forces unquestionably
committed the majority of the atrocious crimes, however. The bloodshed has been
extreme. Nearly half of the population was displaced, and at least 50,000 people were
killed, while another 100,000 were mutilated.108 Despite the customary nature of
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Common Article 3, from the outset of this conflict there were violations of basic human
rights laws, including executions of prisoners, noncombatants and unarmed civilians,
instances of torture, and many rapes, abductions, beatings, illegal searches, arbitrary
arrests, and mutilations, all clearly prohibited by Common Article 3.
Throughout 1998, the AFRC/RUF increased the level of violations to a grotesque
level in undertaking “Operation No Living Thing,” a brutal assault against the civilian
population of Sierra Leone. As the AFRC/RUF moved throughout the country, they cut
of the fingers, noses, ears, hands, arms and legs of those unwilling or unable to fight or to
provide for them. They maimed, decapitated, burned alive, shot or inflicted machete
wounds on civilians, and abducted missionaries and aid workers, raiding aid vehicles in
the process. They abducted civilians, using them as sexual slaves, human shields and
forced laborers. Boys were rounded up and “recruited”, given guns and drugs and told to
be soldiers. Girls and women were raped as a terror tactic. AFRC/RUF soldiers forced
abductees to kill or commit atrocities against their family members, or to choose from a
list of limbs which they would like to have cut off.109
During the 1999 attack on Freetown, AFRC/RUF forces burned entire parts of the
city to the ground, and nearby cities and villages were similarly destroyed. AFRC/RUF
soldiers continued to murder and maim civilians, and engaged in “systematic, organized
and widespread sexual violence against girls and women, including individual and gang
rape, with girls less than 17 years of age being the specific targets. Some were held in
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sexual slavery after being ‘married’ to rebel combatants.”110 Between 5,000 and 6,500
combatants and civilians were killed in the attack on Freetown alone.111
Common Article 3 expressly prohibits “murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture”112 and the crimes committed by members of the AFRC again and
again during their three year reign of terror perfectly fit that bill. Common Article 3
forbids taking civilian hostages.113 The AFRC abducted thousands of men, women and
children. Common Article 3 criminalizes “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment.”114 Surely carving “AFRC” onto the foreheads and
chests of villagers and raping women in front of their families constitutes “outrages upon
personal dignity.” The Article finally provides that there shall be no extrajudicial
killings.115 During the AFRC’s campaign, people were captured and killed at will, with
no reason or meaning other than to provoke terror.
The AFRC clearly violated the minimum standard for human rights violations
provided for in Common Article 3. The amount of violence unleashed in Sierra Leone by
the AFRC was cruel, brutal, and made no distinction between combatant and civilian.
The AFRC “punished” Sierra Leoneans for what they perceived to be support of the
lawfully elected government, and terrorized the entire country.
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B. The Interpretation of Common Article 3 Proposed by the Armed Forced
Revolutionary Council
To the extent that the Special Court for Sierra Leone is bound by the precedent of
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals,116 the AFRC is correct in asserting that
“Common Article 3 applies only if the hostile action directed against a legal government
is of a collective nature and consists of a minimum amount of organization.” Many
judgments have held that some organization of hostilities is required for Common Article
3 to apply, and legal scholars have tended to uphold that view.
The AFRC argue that Common Article 3 does not apply to them because they
were not organized. Despite the disordered nature of the takeover of Freetown in 1997,
the AFRC was organized under a common leader, Johnny Paul Koroma. They were
organized under a name, the AFRC. The AFRC was organized with an agenda of ousting
the existing government and terrorizing civilians into obeying their lawless rule. The
armed soldiers who stormed Freetown with the goal of getting rid of President Kabbah
were organized in their efforts. The subsequent campaigns around the country to quash
dissenting voices and to terrorize civilians were an organized effort, and the 1999 attack
on Freetown to expel the Nigerian forces was an organized strike. The AFRC was
organized.
Some definitions of armed conflict do not take the amount of organization into
account. In the Akayesu decision of the ICTR, for example, the court held that an armed
conflict was any aggression organized to a greater or lesser extent.117 In general, though,
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legal scholars of international humanitarian law are of the opinion that Common Article 3
applies in situations of open armed conflict between two parties that are at least relatively
organized.118 For example, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence also uses the
definition “organized armed forces” when describing when a violent campaign becomes
an “armed conflict.119 The AFRC defense may be correct that some amount of
organization is required for application of Common Article 3, but the facts of the case
also show that there was more than minimal organization.
E. Defenses
1. Mistake of Law
Regarding the application of Common Article 3, one of the few defenses available
to the AFRC defendants is a mistake of law defense. The AFRC could argue that they
did not realize they would be held to the laws of Geneva because they are not a state.
Since a layman might not realize that a violent rebel group would be held to the same
standards as a State where human rights violations were at issue, it’s possible that the
AFRC could argue likewise.120 This argument holds little muster. As addressed
exhaustively above, Common Article 3 is part of customary international law and the
principles of Common Article 3 have been incorporated into other international
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instruments to which Sierra Leone is a party, such as the African Charter.121 Even a
layman with no concept of international law must be aware that to kill, rape, maim,
torture and abduct innocents is a crime. The drafters of the Statute for the Special Court
for Sierra Leone were careful to codify as offenses only those which were accepted as
customary international law or those offenses which were prohibited under treaties to
which Sierra Leone is a party,122 so there could be no doubt that those indicted were
aware of the criminality of their conducts. The AFRC defendants will be unsuccessful in
the argument that they did not realize Common Article 3 would apply to them.
2. Tu Quoque123
The AFRC also may try to argue tu quoque, that their opponents resorted to the
same bloody tactics. The AFRC may argue that the government and the Nigerian forces
in Sierra Leone also violated Common Article 3, and that the civil war was characterized
by lawless violence. While this may be true, the tu quoque defense should not succeed.
That the AFRC’s adversaries were at times equally violent will not validate or defend the
AFRC’s war crimes violations. Simply stated, one party’s wrong does not make another
party right.124 The ICTY rejected the tu quoque defense in the Kupreskic judgment. The
court held that the Nuremberg trials had already declared the defense invalid.125 For the
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same reasons, if the AFRC defends its Common Article 3 allegations with a tu quoque
defense, it will not prevail.
F. Individual Criminal Responsibility and Common Article 3
Although Common Article 3 constitutes an uncertain plane for individual criminal
responsibility, the named defendants likely will be held individually criminally
responsible for violations of Common Article 3. The court in Akayesu held that “it is
clear that the authors of such egregious violations must incur individual criminal
responsibility for their deeds.”126 The Tadic decision held that individual criminal
responsibility is applicable in cases where customary international law has been violated,
and set forth the following test to determine when individual criminal responsibility
comes into play:
1. Clear intent on the part of the international community to criminalize
the conduct;
2. The fact that such conduct may be said to be contrary to elementary
considerations of humanity;
3. The general condemnation of such breaches;
4. The fact that substantive justice and equity require that such conduct
should be regarded as criminal; and
5. The fact that there have been a number of undertakings to punish
certain actions.127

In the AFRC’s case, the crimes for which they are accused are clear violations of
customary international law. There is no doubt that the international community intended
to criminalize extrajudicial killings. There is no doubt that mutilations, severed legs,
arms, ears, hands, noses and fingers, that “AFRC” carved in the chests of victims, is
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contrary to elementary considerations of humanity. There is no doubt that rape and
sexual slavery are generally condemned breaches of human rights law. There is no doubt
that justice and equity require that kidnapping, abducting and recruiting children into
armies be regarded as criminal conduct. And there is no doubt that there have been
undertakings to prosecute these kinds of crimes – the ICTY and the ICTR are modern
examples, but the world has been prosecuting these crimes since Nuremberg.128 The
named defendants, all commanders in the AFRC, gave the orders. If the Special Court
can prosecute only a limited number of people, officers like the defendants, not the child
foot soldiers under their commands, are the men to prosecute.
IV. CONCLUSION
Article 3 is common to all four Geneva Conventions because it expresses the
principles that guide the Conventions. It sets the tone for human rights protections. It is
applicable in all circumstances and to all people. It is clear in its assertion of what will
not be tolerated. It has been accepted by the majority of the world as the absolute
minimum threshold of protected human rights. Its rules are imperative.
Whether or not the AFRC considers itself organized, the facts remain that a group
of people calling themselves the AFRC staged a coup on the democratically elected
government. A group of people calling themselves the AFRC forcibly took control of
entire regions of Sierra Leone and declared to those people that the AFRC was the new
law. A group of people calling themselves the AFRC used their “new law” to justify
killing, torturing, raping and maiming those with no ties to or interests in the conflict.
Article 3 was written to protect those victims of the AFRC.
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